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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Troy Lane Evans appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The relevant facts and course of proceedings of the underlying case were
outlined by the district court in its order granting respondent's motion for
summary dismissal and denying petitioner's motion for summary disposition:
On August 18, 2010, Petitioner, Troy Lane Evans, entered a
guilty plea and was sentenced to five (5) years determinate,
followed by ten (10) years indeterminate, with the Court retaining
jurisdiction for 365 days for Count VII of an Amended Indictment,
Sexual Abuse of a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, a felony. Mr.
Evans successfully completed the retained jurisdiction program and
the sentence was suspended with the Petitioner placed on
probation by an order entered January 27, 2011. The Petitioner
then admitted violating his probation and the original sentence was
imposed by Order Revoking Probation, Judgment of Conviction and
Order of Commitment, entered on September 15, 2011. The term
of confinement in the September 15, 2011 order was corrected to
match the August 18, 2010 order in a corrected judgment entered
April 18, 2012, nunc pro tune September 15, 2011. The Petitioner
requested reconsideration of the sentence under Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 which was denied in an order entered January 5, 2012.
The Petitioner did not file an appeal in this matter.
(R., pp.102-103.)

Evans filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief and affidavit.
(R., pp.5-8.)

The state filed an answer to Evan's pro se petition for post-

conviction relief (R., pp.32-37) as well as a motion for summary dismissal (R.,
pp.46-49). The district court later appointed counsel to assist Evans in his post-
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conviction relief case (R., p.55), who filed an amended petition for relief asserting
five separate bases of ineffectiveness of counsel including trial counsel's failure
to investigate the charges against Evans and a conflict of counsel in the dual
representation of Evans and his co-defendant wife leading to his alleged
involuntary guilty plea (R., pp.65-69).

The state filed an answer to Evans'

amended petition for post-conviction (R., pp.83-86) and a motion for summary
dismissal of the amended petition (R., pp.87-94). Evans filed a cross-motion for
summary disposition of two of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(R., pp.95-97; see also R., pp.98-101.)
One of Evans' claims of ineffective assistance of counsel included an
allegation that he was incorrectly advised of the terms of the plea agreement.
(R., p.1-3.)

Following the correction of a clerical error in Evans' judgment of

conviction, this claim was withdrawn.

(Id.)

Additional claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel asserting a conflict of interest and inadequate preparation
by counsel were dismissed by written order following a hearing wherein the court
found Evans had failed to establish trial counsel's performance was deficient or
any resulting prejudice. (R., pp.102-122.)
Evans timely appealed. (R., pp.122-127.)
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ISSUE

Evans states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr.
Evans' claim that his defense counsel provided ineffective
assistance by representing both Mr. Evan and his co-defendant.
2.
Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr.
Evans' claim that his defense counsel provided ineffective
assistance by not conducting a sufficient investigation of the
charges filed against Mr. Evans.
(Appellant's brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue as follows:
Has Evans failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT

Evans Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

A

Introduction
Evans contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition

for post-conviction relief. (Appellant's brief, pp. 2-16.) Evans addresses only two
of the claims of ineffective assistance originally asserted in his amended petition
for post-conviction relief. Evans first contends the district court erred in
concluding the entry of his plea was not the result of dual representation
amounting to a conflict of interest. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-12.)

Evans' second

contention is that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his assertion
trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation of the charges against
him. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-16.)
Because Evans

failed to present evidence establishing prima facie

claims of deficient performance or resulting prejudice, his assertions of error fail.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted.
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Nellsch v.
State, 122 Idaho 426,434,835 P.2d 661,669 (Ct. App. 1992).
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C.

General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden

of establishing,

by a

preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho
at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548,
550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint
in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain more than "a short and plain
statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho
at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 8).

The petitioner must submit

verified facts within his personal knowledge and produce admissible evidence to
support his allegations.

kl

(citing I.C. § 19-4903).

Furthermore, the factual

showing in a post-conviction relief application must be in the form of evidence
that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho
612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978
P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative.

''To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises
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no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c));
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.

While a court must accept a

petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164
P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112
(2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief,
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing
the petition.

kl (citing

Stuartv. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220

(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law."

D.

kl

Evans Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim
That The Dual Representation By Counsel Of He And His Co-Defendant
Wife Constituted Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Evans claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "adequately

separate her representation of [Evans] and his wife by negotiating [Evans'] wife's
plea resolution to be contingent on [Evans'] guilty plea." (R., p.67.) The district
court summarily dismissed this claim, finding Evans' had failed to present
evidence establishing an actual conflict of interest. (R., pp.119-120.) On appeal,
Evans argues there was an actual conflict of interest in the dual representation of
himself and his co-defendant wife where "the plea deals offered to both
defendants were contingent on Mr. Evans pleading to a felony, while hi co6

defendant would have her charges reduced to a misdemeanor."

(Appellant's

brief, p.7.) Because this assertion of actual conflict is belied by the record and
applicable case law, Evans' argument fails.
"Joint representation of defendants is not per se ineffective assistance of
counsel." State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,511,988 P.2d 1170, 1185 (1999)
(citation omitted). Rather, a defendant seeking relief based on an alleged conflict
of interest, to which she did not object at trial, must demonstrate that counsel
"actively represented conflicting interests" and that the conflict of interest actually
affected the adequacy of the lawyer's performance.

Hairston, 133 Idaho at 511,

988 P.2d at 1185; see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (where
defendant

alleges

a

conflict

based

upon

his

counsel's

simultaneous

representation of defendant and the prosecutor's key witness, defendant must
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's
performance); State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703, 215 P.3d 414, 423 (2009)
("Whether a trial court's failure to adequately inquiry, but the defendant did not
object to the conflict at trial, the defendant's conviction will only be reversed if he
or she can prove that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's
performance.")

An actual conflict is defined by its effect on counsel, not by

whether there is a "mere theoretical division of loyalties." Mickens v. Taylor, 535
U.S. 162, 171, 172 n.5 (2002).

"[T]he possibility of conflict is insufficient to

impugn a criminal conviction." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 62, 106 P.3d 376,
388 (2004) (citations omitted). Absent a showing of actual conflict, a defendant
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is not entitled to reversal of her conviction. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173-74; Burger
v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987).
As the district court concluded in granting summary dismissal of Evans'
petition for post-conviction relief, Evans "was represented by counsel he and his
wife retained." (R., p.117.) That Evans was aware of the dual representation
was "obvious" based on the fact that "they all appeared in court simultaneously."
(Id.) Evans asserts on appeal "an actual conflict is evident in his case" because
both he and his co-defendant wife's "pleas were contingent on [him] accepting
this deal." (Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.) This assertion is not supported by the
record.
At the change of plea hearing, counsel for Evans explained the nature of
the plea negotiations with the state:
MS. DODGE:
Sadena.

Sherry [sic] Dodge representing both Troy and

THE COURT:
And I understand we're going to be doing a
change of plea today; is that right?
MS. DODGE:
That's right, on Troy. And on Sadena, once we
enter the plea with Troy, then that's going to be remand [sic] for
plea and sentencing to magistrate.
THE COURT:

A plea agreement on Troy?

MS DODGE:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Can one of you put it on the record?

MS. DODGE:
Judge, the offer in this case is that Mr. Evans
will be pleading guilty to, I believe, it's Count 7, which is sexual
abuse of a minor under 16. Mr. Evans agrees to waive Estrada for
PSI. and SANE evaluation. The state will be recommending a 5
plus 10 for unified sentence of 15. It will recommend probation if
the psychosexual returns as low risk and a good candidate for
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community-based treatment. If probation is granted, the state will
be asking for local incarceration with a maximum of 1 year.
Obviously, he will follow through with the SANE treatment as
recommended in the evaluation. Suspend all fines, and the facts
can be considered and argued at sentencing, and all victims may
read the PSI and submit the victim-impact statement, and then the
no contact with minors.
(6/2/2010 Tr., p.1, L.12 - p.2, L.15.) The negotiations ultimately reduced the
seven counts of felony sex offenses to one count of sexual abuse of a minor with
a possible probation recommendation by the state.
Evans argues on appeal that he and his wife's pleas "hinged on his entry
of that plea" to the one count of sex abuse which would "indicate that [his]
interests were at odds with his wife's, and that counsel was no longer able to
fulfill all her responsibilities to [him]." (Appellant's brief, pp.11-12.) Contrary to
Evans' argument, the record does not support a factual claim that his wife's
benefit of the plea bargain was contingent on the entry of his plea.

(See, R.,

pp.118-119.) Further, had Evans' co-defendant wife's negotiated resolution been
contingent on Evans' plea, that alone does not constitute a conflict of interest that
actually affected trial counsel's performance. See State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho
530, 537-538, 211 P.3d 775, 783 (Ct. App. 2008) (although joint plea agreements
are not favored, they are not improper).
What the record does show is that Evans was charged with multiple
felonies carrying lengthy possible terms of incarceration but due to the
negotiations engaged in between his counsel and the state, he was given the
opportunity of a potential probation sentence for one felony conviction while his
co-defendant wife would only face a misdemeanor charge.
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This does not

establish the active representation of conflicting interests, nor does it establish a
conflict

of

performance.

interest

actually

affected

the

adequacy

of

Evans'

lawyer's

Just the opposite, it appears Evans received a beneficial

resolution through the representation of he and his wife by trial counsel.
Because Evans failed to meet his burden of showing an actual conflict of
interest, much less that trial counsel's performance was adversely affected by an
actual conflict of interest, he has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of
his conflict of interest claim.

E.

Evans Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim
That Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Adequately Investigate The
Claims Against Him
In his amended petition for post-conviction relief, Evans asserted his trial

counsel "failed to investigate discrepancies between the grand jury transcript and
the police reports, investigate the appropriate statute of limitations, and file an
appropriate Motion to Dismiss Indictment." (R., p.66.) On appeal, Evans asserts
had trial counsel followed through "on the legitimate concern that three of the
charges levied against him were improper," he would have gone to trial instead of
pleading guilty. (Appellant's brief, p.15.) The district court held that because the
challenged charges were dismissed as part of the plea agreement, Evans had
failed to present a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
pp.111-112.)

(R.,

Evans has failed to demonstrate error in the district court's

analysis.
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a postconviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting
10

prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v.

Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).

An attorney's

performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson
v. State, 110 Idaho 631,634,718 P.2d 283,286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116
Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, a
defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon
v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132
Idaho 681,685, 978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). The United States Supreme
Court has recently reiterated:
Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task. An
ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules
of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and
so the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care,
lest intrusive post-trial inquiry threaten the integrity of the very
adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve.
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citations and quotations
omitted).
As the court discussed in summarily dismissing Evans' petition for postconviction relief, the charges of concern were dismissed pursuant to plea
negotiations. (R., p.111.) The court concluded there was no showing of deficient
performance or prejudice in getting the charges dismissed through plea
negotiations as opposed to through the filing of a motion to dismiss. (R., p.112)
Moreover, Evans failed to provide evidence sufficient to establish that a motion to
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dismiss the challenged counts would have been successful. (Id.) Both of these
conclusions are supported by the record and the law. Evans failed to carry his
burden of establishing either deficient performance or resulting prejudice.
Therefore, he has also failed to show error in the denial of his post-conviction
petition.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Evans' petition for post-conviction relief.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of September 2013 served a
true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy
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BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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